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We study the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth for 23 OECD 
countries from 1975 to 2001 by using new panel data on sub-federal tax autonomy. While 
initial estimations suggest that fiscal decentralization causes lower growth rates, we find that 
this result is not robust to alternative specifications. We also fail to obtain evidence for a 
negative relationship in a number of additional robustness checks. We thus conclude that fis-
cal decentralization is unrelated to economic growth. 
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1. Introduction 
Scholars of fiscal federalism are increasingly interested in the relationship between fis-
cal decentralization and economic growth, and a large number of theoretical and em-
pirical studies have been conducted on this question in recent years. According to the 
theory of fiscal federalism, fiscal competition leads to efficient allocative outcomes 
(Oates 1972, Tiebout 1956), which might eventually promote higher rates of economic 
growth. In addition, the case for decentralization is made on the grounds that localized 
experimentation leads to more policy innovations (i.e. laboratory federalism, Oates 
1999), and that jurisdictional competition forces politicians to provide an efficient bun-
dle of public goods, while limiting their ability to over-tax citizens (Oates 1993, Bren-
nan and Buchanan 1980).  
Formal theoretical models also provide arguments for a relationship between decentrali-
zation and growth, but the direction of the effect is less clear-cut. While Brueckner 
(1999) shows that the impact of decentralization on growth depends on the different de-
mand for public goods by the young and the old, Brueckner (2006) finds that decentrali-
zation generates incentives to invest in human capital while being young, and, through 
this channel, increases economic growth permanently. Davoodi and Zou (1998) argue 
that an efficient level of decentralization exists, and that, if the prevailing level differs 
from the optimal level, appropriate reforms can increase growth. Rauscher (2007) de-
velops an endogenous growth model with Leviathan governments in which fiscal com-
petition due to decentralization leads to a reduced frequency of political innovation and 
lower economic growth. He assumes, however, that the private capital stock is constant, 
and that only public capital accumulation drives economic growth. Relaxing these as-
sumptions, Rauscher (2006) obtains the opposite result: Increased mobility of tax bases 
yields an increased frequency of political innovation and higher economic growth. 
Given these competing results in the theoretical literature, it is not surprising that the 
empirical evidence is also ambiguous. Several studies find a positive relationship be-
tween fiscal decentralization and economic growth. These include, inter alia, Akai and 
Sakata (2002) who use state-level cross-section data from the US; Stansel (2005) who 
uses data on 314 US metropolitan areas from 1960-1990; Zhang and Zou (2001) who 
use data on Indian states; Iimi (2005) who uses a panel of 51 developing and developed – 3 – 
countries from 1971-2001; and Thießen (2003) who uses panel data from 26 OECD 
countries. Desai, Freinkman, and Goldberg (2005) also find a positive, but nonlinear 
relationship between an index of regional economic recovery and the tax retention rate 
for a panel of Russian sub-federal units. 
Other studies fail to find any relationship, and some even identify a negative one. To the 
first set of studies belong Xie, Zou and Davoodi (1999), who conduct a time-series 
analysis with data on the US federal level; Woller and Phillips (1998), who use a panel 
of 23 developing countries; and Thornton (2007), who conducts a cross-section analysis 
with 19 OECD countries. To the set of studies which find a negative relationship belong 
Davoodi and Zou (1998), who use a panel of 46 developing and developed countries 
from 1970-1989, Zhang and Zou (1998) , who use a panel of 28 Chinese provinces, and 
Jin and Zou (2005) who use a panel of 30 Chinese provinces. 
When conducting an empirical analysis on the consequences of fiscal decentralization, 
probably the most important methodological problem is to find an accurate measure of 
the prevailing degree of decentralization in a given country. Most studies assume a 
budgetary perspective and use measures constructed by taking the ratio of sub-federal 
revenues and/or spending to total government revenue and/or spending. Especially in 
cross-country studies, such measures are usually constructed on the basis of the IMF’s 
Government Finance Statistics (GFS) dataset. One well recognized drawback of the 
GFS measures is that they provide an inaccurate picture of the “true” level of decen-
tralization. As Rodden (2004) notes, they take the expenditures undertaken and the 
revenue obtained by sub-federal governments at face value. On the expenditure side, 
they do not indicate whether sub-federal expenditures are largely mandated by central 
government regulations. If this were the case, the GFS measures might incorrectly sug-
gest a high degree of decentralization, although the autonomy of sub-federal govern-
ments over fiscal matters might actually be negligible. On the revenue side, there is a 
similar problem. While the data might indicate a high level of revenue decentralization 
because a large share of the consolidated tax revenue of the public sector flows to sub-
federal governments, their power to autonomously decide on tax rates or bases might be 
negligible. That is, a large value of the GFS measures for revenue decentralization 
might not necessarily imply a large amount of de facto autonomy. 
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Noting the deficiencies of the GFS decentralization measures, Thornton (2007) uses a 
measure that supposedly captures the “true” amount of sub-federal autonomy. This 
measure, originally provided by OECD (1999) (and updated by Blöchliger and King, 
2006), is obtained by differentiating sub-federal tax revenue according to the level of 
autonomy sub-federal governments have over the associated rates and bases, and then 
calculating the ratios with regard to total government tax receipts. Even though the data 
used by Thornton (2007) provide a better approximation of the true extent of decentrali-
zation than the GFS measures and hence lend his results credibility, they exhibit two 
drawbacks. First, they are only available as a cross-section dataset and, second, for 19 
countries only. This, in turn, implies that the results, which indicate that there is no ro-
bust relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth, might be dis-
torted due to unobserved heterogeneity and/or small-sample biases. 
The aim of this paper, therefore, is to complement Thornton’s (2007) study on the im-
pact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth by addressing these problems while 
simultaneously using a set of decentralization measures which capture the “true” degree 
of fiscal decentralization. Our decentralization data is provided by Stegarescu (2005) 
and is based on the OECD (1999) methodology. It is thus a natural extension of the 
measures used by Thornton (2007), because it is (a) constructed according to the same 
classification scheme, (b) available for 23 countries, and, most importantly, (c) as a 
large yearly panel for the time period 1975-2001. This dataset not only allows the appli-
cation of panel data methods, but also enables us to conduct several robustness tests.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss the 
decentralization variables, the econometric model, and the methodology. In Section 3, 
we present our results. In Section 4, we summarize and conclude. 
2.  Data and Econometric Model  
2.1. New Data on Revenue Decentralization 
A first important difference of our as compared to previous studies is the use of Stega-
rescu’s (2005) decentralization data. Following the approach suggested by OECD 
(1999), he presents two different decentralization measures. The first measure, to which 
we will refer as revenue decentralization 1, is constructed by summing all sub-federal 
tax revenue from taxes for which sub-federal governments may determine either rates, 
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bases or both, and then dividing the sum by total government tax revenue.
1 The second 
measure, which will be referred to as revenue decentralization 2, is constructed by 
summing all tax revenue from shared taxes for which sub-federal governments may co-
determine the revenue distribution or other allocation details of the joint taxation sys-
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Figure 1: Evolution of the Average of the Decentralization Measures 

















Figure 2: Evolution of Revenue decentralization 1 in Selected Countries 
Source: Stegarescu (2005) 
                                                 
1.   This measure is similar to the one used by Thornton (2007), but also varies across time. 



















Figure 3: Evolution of Revenue decentralization 2 in Selected Countries 
Source: Stegarescu (2005) 
 
Figure 1 presents the evolution of the average values of these two measures across time. 
Apparently, about 20% of sub-federal revenues originate from taxes over which lower 
level governments have a large degree of autonomy. In contrast, sub-federal govern-
ments have only marginal control over the allocation of shared taxes. Both variables 
seem to vary little across time, although we observe a slight increase in both decentrali-
zation measures since the end of the 1980s.  
Figure 2 shows, however, that some countries exhibit a considerable amount of within 
variation for the revenue decentralization 1 measure. Since the middle of the 1970s, 
Spain exhibits an increasing trend in tax autonomy. Belgium and Italy have sharp in-
creases in tax autonomy in the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, respec-
tively. In France, a modest increase of revenue decentralization can be observed since 
the process of decentralization started in 1982 (Loi Deferre). Germany, on the other end 
of the scale, has only little time variation in the revenue decentralization 1 variable.  
In Figure 3, we present the evolution of the revenue decentralization 2 variable for the 
same set of countries. Apparently, there is less within-variation in this variable than in 
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In Figure 4, we plot the average level of the revenue decentralization 1 variable in each 
country against average economic growth for the sample period. This figure indicates 
that there is substantial between-variation in both the level of economic growth and 
revenue decentralization between the countries that are considered in this paper. In Fig-
ure 5, we plot the average level of the revenue decentralization 2 variable against aver-
age labor productivity growth. As evidenced by the previous figures, there are only five 
countries, Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, and Switzerland, with non-zero values for 
this measure of decentralization.  
The bivariate plots indicate (i) a negative relationship between revenue decentralization 
1 and labor productivity growth and (ii) a positive but weak relationship between reve-
nue decentralization 2 and labor productivity growth. It remains to be seen, however, 
whether this association survives more rigorous econometric tests.  
2.2. Econometric Model and Methodology 
Most empirical studies on the relation between decentralization and economic growth 
propose an econometric framework similar to the approach chosen by Davoodi and Zou 
(1998). They derive the empirical specification from an endogenous growth model 
which insinuates that for a given government size, fiscal decentralization has a perma-
nent effect on economic growth. Our econometric model is thus specified as follows: 
Economic Growthit= β0 + β1 Decentralizationit+ β2 Economic Controlsit+ uit,        (1) 
The dependent variable in this model is the growth rate of labor productivity.
2 We in-
clude, in addition to the revenue decentralization measures, several independent vari-
ables at the right hand side of equation 1. In order to control for catch-up effects, the lag 
of GDP per worker enters the model (note that unlike in cross-section studies, we can-
not include the “initial” level of GDP per worker since this variable would be multi-
collinear with country fixed effects).
3 We control for the effect of the tax burden (and 
thus for the size of government) on economic growth by including the tax to GDP ra-
                                                 
2.    Data source: OECD Labor Productivity Growth Dataset.  
3.   Data source: Penn World Tables 6.2. 
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tio.
4 Human capital is proxied by the gross enrolment rate in secondary education
5, and 
the growth rate of physical capital by the investment share from GDP.
6 We also control 
for population growth
7. Additional controls, used for robustness checks, are a measure 
of integration into the world economy (openness)
8, the inflation rate
9, and a federation 
dummy.
10 Summary statistics for these unbalanced panel data are provided in Table 1.
11  
Table 1: Summary Statistics  
Variable Obs Mean Std.  Dev. Min  Max
Rev. Dec. 1  554 20.261 16.557 0.050  61.500
Rev. Dec. 2  554 2.972 9.533 0.000  42.730
Labor productivity  554 2.181 1.946 -8.700 10.000
Investment share  554 24.847 4.358 15.550  42.170
Tax/GDP 554 36.274 7.297 18.200  53.900
Education 554 98.217 17.211 57.291  159.499
Population growth  554 0.006 0.004 -0.003  0.016
Lag GDP per worker  554 41.655 10.517 22.125  114.449
Openness 554 60.061 41.770 10.780  286.480
Inflation 554 6.404 7.382 -1.600  84.300
Federation 554 0.285 0.452 0.000  1.000
Our test strategy is as follows: In a first step, we conduct the econometric analysis with 
yearly panel data. In the baseline specifications, we use, individually and jointly, both 
decentralization variables, the one concerned with tax autonomy and the one concerned 
with co-decision making. We first estimate the model with pooled OLS. Thereafter, we 
take the panel characteristics of the dataset into account and estimate random and fixed 
effects models. The baseline models contains as control variables the tax revenue share 
of GDP, the investment share, education, population growth, and lagged GDP per 
worker. As a first robustness checks, we estimate models which additionally include 
openness, inflation, and the federation dummy. In all models, wee include time-fixed 
                                                 
4.   Data source: OECD Revenue Statistics. 
5.   Data source: World Bank Edstat Database. Data before 1990 is only available in 5-year intervals. We 
replace the missing observations with the value of the initial year of the period. 
6.   Data source: Penn World Tables 6.2. 
7.   Data Source: Penn World Tables 6.2. 
8.   Data source: Penn World Tables 6.2. 
9.   Data source: IMF World Economic Outlook. 
10.  The federation dummy changes its value for Belgium and Spain in the sample period from 0 to 1 
(these countries eventually become federations). Since there is some within-variation in this variable, 
we can include it in the fixed effects regressions. The reader should be aware, though, that any con-
clusion on the impact of “being a federation” that relies on the results of this set of models is based 
on the information from only two countries. 
11.  Note that for Germany before 1991 only data for the western part is available. – The panel is unbal-
anced mainly due to some lacking observations for Austria, Greece and Portugal. 
 – 10 – 
effects in order to capture common shocks in the OECD countries in our sample (the 
estimated coefficients on the time fixed effects are not reported in the regression tables, 
however). We also use robust standard errors and, when appropriate, cluster observa-
tions by countries in order to account for intra-group correlation. 
In a second step, we control for “short-term” variability in our variables by estimating 
regressions on the mean and in five-year averages. In a third step, we acknowledge that 
both revenue decentralization measures display relatively little time variance (see Fig-
ure 1) by estimating fixed effects models without the decentralization and federalism 
variables as a first stage regression. In a second stage regression, we use the decentrali-
zation measures to explain the predicted fixed effects from the first stage by using a 
method proposed by Hsiao (2003, p. 51-53) and Plümper and Troeger (2007).  
3. Results 
3.1. Results from Yearly Panel Data 
We start by presenting the results obtained by pooled OLS, random effects, and fixed 
effects estimations of the baseline model in Table 2. First, note that the economic con-
trols perform reasonably well. The coefficient on the investment share variable is sig-
nificantly positive in all specifications, albeit insignificant in the random and fixed ef-
fects models. Education has an expected positive sign, but is insignificant. Population 
growth is insignificant. The sign of the coefficient is negative in the models that exploit 
both the between and within variation (pooled OLS and RE), and positive in the fixed 
effects models.  The lagged GDP per worker has an expected negative sign, which is 
significant in the random and fixed effects models. The tax share variable is negatively 
related to growth, a conclusion which especially holds for the fixed effects models 
where the coefficient becomes significant.  
The revenue decentralization 1 variable generally enters with a negative and significant 
sign in the pooled OLS and the random effects specifications. While it continues to be 
significant in the first fixed effects model, the coefficient becomes insignificant when 
both decentralization variables are jointly included.  Although the revenue decentraliza-
tion 2 variable also generally displays a negative sign, it is consistently insignificant.  
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Overall, this first set of regressions indicates that sub-federal tax autonomy leads to 
lower economic growth.  It remains to be seen, however, whether this result is robust to 
alternative specifications of the baseline model. 
A first set of such robustness checks are presented in Table 3. In this table, we collect 
the results from re-estimating the models in Table 2 after including three additional 
variables: Openness, inflation, and a federation dummy. In general, the economic con-
trols already included in Table 2 display similar coefficients, both in sign and magni-
tude, as in Table 2. The additionally included control variables also perform reasonably 
well. Openness enters with a significantly positive coefficient in the pooled OLS and 
the random effects models, but loses its significance in the fixed effects specifications. 
Inflation, on the other hand, is significantly negative in the fixed effects models. The 
coefficient on the federation dummy is consistently negative and significant, a result 
that is driven by the developments in Spain and Belgium. 
The implication of the results for the remaining control variables, which are remarkably 
similar between Tables 2 and 3, is straightforward. The significantly negative sign of 
the lagged GDP per worker variable indicates that countries with low levels of produc-
tivity tend to have higher growth rates (a catching-up effect). The significantly negative 
coefficient of the tax to GDP and the inflation variable indicates that both large tax bur-
dens and monetary expansion retard economic growth. The significantly positive coeffi-
cient on the openness variable indicates that more open economies tend to grow faster. 
The revenue decentralization 1 variable, while continuing to display a negative coeffi-
cient, is generally insignificant (except in the first OLS model). Revenue decentraliza-
tion 2, on the other hand, displays, in contrast to the results in Table 3, a positive coeffi-
cient. However, the estimated coefficient is generally insignificant except in the second 
RE model.  
Overall, these results lead to a re-evaluation of the findings from Table 2 with respect to 
the decentralization variables. Apparently, once additional control variables are taken 
into account, the finding of a negative relationship between the revenue decentralization 
variables and economic growth ceases to be valid.  We rather find that fiscal decentrali-




Table 2: Regressions of Economic Growth on Fiscal Decentralization and Controls, Baseline Specification, 23 
OECD Countries, 1975-2001, Unbalanced Panel 
  OLS1  OLS2  OLS3  RE1 RE2 RE3 FE1 FE2 FE3 
  b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Investment  share  0.072***  0.052*  0.075***  0.036 0.027 0.037 0.006 0.009 0.009 
  (0.025)  (0.028)  (0.024)  (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Secondary  Education  0.008  0.001  0.009  0.006 0.003 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.006 
  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Population growth  -26.579  -36.015  -33.138  -7.418  -9.365  -10.107  14.181  13.964  13.469 
  (28.432)  (36.493)  (28.255)  (27.790) (31.911) (28.944) (34.607) (34.647) (34.622) 
Lag GDP per worker  -0.017  -0.022  -0.016  -0.044*** -0.050*** -0.045*** -0.117*** -0.114*** -0.116*** 
  (0.012)  (0.018)  (0.012)  (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Tax/GDP 0.003  0.006  0.001  -0.017  -0.023 -0.020 -0.107***  -0.117***  -0.109*** 
  (0.013)  (0.023)  (0.013)  (0.020) (0.025) (0.021) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Rev. decentralization 1  -0.022**  –  -0.023** -0.022*** –  -0.022*** -0.038*  –  -0.030 
  (0.008)    (0.008)  (0.008)   (0.008) (0.021)   (0.023) 
Rev. decentralization 2  –  -0.002  -0.009 –  -0.009  -0.012  –  -0.044  -0.027 
   (0.006)  (0.007)    (0.011)  (0.010)    (0.029)  (0.031) 
N  554  554  554  554 554 554 554 554 554 
R
2
  0.082  0.052  0.082  – – – 0.103  0.102  0.102 
χ2  –  –  –  365.464 329.959 341.804 –  –  – 
F  –  –  –  – – – 3.801  3.619  3.678 
Root  MSE  1.864  1.895  1.864  1.754 1.753 1.751 1.688 1.689 1.689 
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are the standard errors of the estimated parameters. ‘*’, ‘**’, or ‘***’ denote significance at the 10, 5, 
or 1 percent level, respectively. R
2  is the adjusted coefficient of determination (corrected by the degrees of freedom). The F and χ
2 –
statistics are used to test the significance of the model. The computations have been performed by Stata 9.2. The panel is unbalanced 
mainly due to some lacking observations for Austria, Greece and Portugal. 
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  OLS1  OLS2  OLS3  RE1 RE2 RE3 FE1 FE2 FE3 
  b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Investment  share  0.059**  0.040 0.056*  0.041 0.035 0.037 0.027 0.028 0.027 
  (0.026) (0.029) (0.031) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Secondary  Education  0.005 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Population  growth  -17.630 -9.301  -13.576 -4.593  -0.005  0.301  10.852  10.483  10.808 
  (23.986) (32.193) (29.703) (23.068) (24.077) (24.577) (34.870) (34.867) (34.914) 
Lag GDP per worker  -0.045**  -0.046**  -0.044**  -0.075*** -0.077*** -0.078*** -0.119*** -0.119*** -0.120*** 
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Tax/GDP  -0.030 -0.040*  -0.032 -0.063***  -0.068*** -0.068*** -0.117*** -0.120*** -0.116*** 
  (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
Openness  0.010*  0.011**  0.010*  0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*  0.016*  0.016* 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Inflation  -0.068*** -0.068*** -0.068*** -0.053*** -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.041  -0.041  -0.042 
  (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Federation  dummy -0.450 -0.895*  -0.554 -0.731* -1.091***  -1.005**  -0.977* -1.230* -1.044 
  (0.283) (0.440) (0.481) (0.385) (0.347) (0.413) (0.511) (0.663) (0.673) 
Rev. decentralization 1  -0.014*    -0.012 -0.009   -0.005 -0.019   -0.020 
  (0.007)   (0.008) (0.008)   (0.009) (0.023)   (0.023) 
Rev. decentralization 2    0.018  0.006    0.022**  0.018    0.004  0.007 
    (0.012) (0.014)   (0.010) (0.013)   (0.042) (0.042) 
N  554 554 554 554 554 554 554 554 554 
R
2
  0.140  0.135  0.139  – – – 0.117  0.116  0.115 
χ2  –  –  –  332.941 505.839 494.371 –  –  – 
F  – – – – – – 3.803  3.739  3.719 
Root  MSE  1.804 1.809 1.806 1.711 1.710 1.710 1.675 1.676 1.677 
Table 3: Regressions of Economic Growth on Fiscal Decentralization and Controls, Robust Specifications, 23 
OECD Countries, 1975-2001, Unbalanced Panel 
For Notes: See Table 2.   
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3.2. Controlling for short-term variability 
In this section, we further explore whether fiscal decentralization in indeed insignifi-
cant, or whether the results in the previous sections are a consequence of certain charac-
teristics of the data or incorrectly specified models. In particular, the results might be 
biased because of short-term variability in both the dependent and some of the inde-
pendent variables. Such variability could cause the estimated coefficients to be domi-
nated by spurious correlations, or the associated standard errors to be inflated. 
 
Table 4: Regressions of Economic Growth on Fiscal Decen-
tralization and Controls, Regressions on the Mean, 23 OECD 
Countries, 1975-2001, Unbalanced Panel  
 OLS1  OLS2  OLS3  OLS4  OLS5 
 b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se 
Investment share  0.103***  0.067**  0.083*  0.056  0.075 
 (0.027)  (0.030)  (0.044)  (0.043)  (0.053) 
Secondary  Education  0.015 -0.006  -0.002 -0.015  0.007 
 (0.023)  (0.024)  (0.021)  (0.023)  (0.029) 
Population growth  -35.442  -60.810  -5.543  -36.686  -21.262 
 (56.674)  (71.302)  (58.376)  (76.252)  (62.964) 
Lag GDP per worker  -0.004  -0.008  -0.049  -0.059  -0.038 
 (0.018)  (0.024)  (0.033)  (0.039)  (0.032) 
Tax/GDP 0.003  0.014  0.001  -0.001  -0.014 
 (0.023)  (0.041)  (0.035)  (0.052)  (0.044) 
Openness –  –  0.008  0.012  0.007 
     (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Inflation –  –  -0.090***  -0.089**  -0.098** 
     (0.030)  (0.034)  (0.037) 
Federation dummy  –  –  –  –  -0.215 
         (0.470) 
Rev. decentralization 1  -0.023*  –  -0.018  –  -0.019 
 (0.011)    (0.011)    (0.011) 
Rev. decentralization 2  –  -0.005  –  -0.007  -0.009 
   (0.010)    (0.010)  (0.016) 
N 23  23  23  23  23 
R
2   0.083 0.146  0.235  0.110 0.168 
F 4.639  2.004  8.108  6.567  13.083 
Root MSE  0.752  0.840  0.687  0.741  0.716 
For Notes: See Table 2. 
To investigate this possibility, we conduct regressions on the mean. That is, we calcu-
late the country averages of the dependent and independent variables of the fully speci-
fied model in Table 3, and then estimate a purely cross-sectional model. This approach 
has the advantage that it underlines the long-run growth effects of the included factors. 
In particular, the relatively larger within variation of fiscal decentralization is exploited. 
Compared to a cross-section analysis for one single year, averaging in the regressions 
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on the mean avoids the reliance on the idiosyncracies of that singular year. However, 
the results, which are presented in Table 4, continue to suggest that sub-federal auton-
omy is not significantly affecting economic growth: both decentralization measures are 
insignificant once they are jointly included.  
A shortcoming of the regression on the mean approach is that it completely discards the 
panel characteristics of the data. Therefore, using five-year instead of full cross-section 
averages might be a reasonable compromise between taking the within-variation in the 
panel into account and controlling for short-term variability.   
Table 5: Regressions of Economic Growth on Fiscal Decentralization and 
Controls, Five Year Averages, 23 OECD Countries, 1975-2001 
 OLS  RE  FE  OLS  RE  FE 
  b/se b/se b/se b/se  b/se b/se 
Investment share  0.100***  0.092***  0.032  0.071*  0.069*  0.052 
  (0.027) (0.031) (0.056) (0.036)  (0.037) (0.063) 
Education -0.003  -0.002  -0.002 -0.004  -0.005 -0.003 
  (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010)  (0.010) (0.013) 
Population growth  -21.314  -19.662  -8.486  -13.356  -13.056  -15.823 
  (30.991) (34.926) (45.236) (32.604)  (35.934) (47.134) 
Lag GDP per worker  -0.000  -0.000**  -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Tax/GDP  0.019  0.015  -0.057 -0.019  -0.024 -0.053 
  (0.016) (0.019) (0.050) (0.025)  (0.025) (0.000) 
Openness –  –  –  0.012**  0.013***  0.010 
       (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.011) 
Inflation –  –  –  -0.044**  -0.039*  -0.024 
       (0.018)  (0.022)  (0.036) 
Rev. decentralization 1  -0.024***  -0.024***  -0.029 -0.010  -0.008 -0.025 
  (0.008) (0.007) (0.019) (0.007)  (0.008) (0.020) 
Rev. decentralization 2  -0.009  -0.011  -0.006  0.006  0.009  0.038 
  (0.007) (0.009) (0.038) (0.014)  (0.017) (0.027) 
Federation dummy  –  –  –  -0.457  -0.563  -1.198 
       (0.515)  (0.586)  (0.730) 
N  107 107 107 107  107 107 
R
2
  0.172 –  0.154 0.272  –  0.157 
F 7.563  –  4.709  11.603  –  6.766 
For Notes: See Table 2. 
The results from estimating both the baseline and the fully specified model in which the 
two decentralization variables are jointly included with five-year averages are collected 
in Table 5. They confirm the previous results for both the decentralization and the re-
maining control variables. They indicate in particular that once we control for inflation, 
openness, and whether a country is a federation, both revenue decentralization 1 and 2 
are not robustly related to economic growth.  
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3.2. Explaining the Fixed Effects by Decentralization and Fiscal Federalism 
As argued above, one reason as to why the coefficients of the decentralization variables 
are insignificant in the fixed effects models might be that the amount of within-variation 
in these variables is insufficient to obtain precise estimates. Indeed, most of the varia-
tion in the decentralization variables, as evidenced by the Figures 1 to 3, is between 
countries.  
Since revenue arrangements between tiers of government are quite sticky and rarely 
change, they can be thought of as a part of the long run institutional structure of the 
state; and since institutional features tend to be relatively constant over time, it might 
not be surprising that the revenue decentralization variables are insignificant in the fixed 
effects models. It is well known that if a variable is measured with error and displays a 
low level of within variation, fixed effects models aggravate the attenuation bias caused 
by the errors in variables problem. In effect, the estimates are biased towards zero in 
this case (Johnston and Dinardo, 1997, p. 400). 
In order to deal with the problem of low within variation, we apply a procedure pro-
posed by Hsiao (2003, p. 51-53) and Plümper and Troeger (2007). They suggest that a 
fixed effects model without those variables which exhibit low within-variation should 
be estimated initially. Then, the predicted fixed effects should be retrieved. Finally, they 
should be regressed on the average values of the variables with low within variation. 
The idea is to explain a country’s autonomous propensity to grow by its time constant 
institutional structure. 
Table 6: Regression on Fixed Effects, OECD Countries 
  OLS1 OLS2 OLS3 OLS4 
  b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Rev. decentralization 1  -0.009    -0.007  0.006 
 (0.016)    (0.018)  (0.018) 
Rev. decentralization 2    0.021  0.018  0.050** 
   (0.015)  (0.018)  (0.023) 
Federation  dummy     -1.086* 
     (0.579) 
N  23 23 23 23 
R
2
  -0.035 -0.025 -0.069 -0.030 
F  0.346 1.947 1.264 2.430 
Root  MSE  1.424 1.417 1.448 1.421 
For Notes: See Table 2. 
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We present the results from this procedure in Table 6. Note that the fixed effects are 
retrieved after estimating a model with the “robust” specification (the one which in-
cludes all control variables). The estimation results collected in this table indicate that 
once it is controlled for whether a country is a federation, both revenue decentralization 
1 and 2 are positively related to economic growth, even though only revenue decentrali-
zation 2 is significant. Being a federation, on the other hand, seems to lead to lower 
growth rates as evidenced by the negative and significant coefficient on this dummy 
variable.  
Overall, these results confirm the findings from Table 3. There is no evidence that reve-
nue decentralization leads to lower growth rates. On the contrary, there is even some 
evidence that sub-federal control over shared taxes is beneficial for economic outcomes. 
On the other hand, federations seem to have lower growth rates. 
4. Conclusion 
This paper is motivated by the recent results of Thornton (2007) who, by applying a 
measure of fiscal decentralization which captures the “true” amount of sub-federal 
autonomy, finds that there is no significant relationship between fiscal decentralization 
and economic growth. We draw on similar data, but extend his approach by (a) using a 
panel dataset, (b) a slightly larger number of countries, and (c) more detailed specifica-
tions. In initial regressions, we obtain that fiscal decentralization is negatively related to 
economic growth. However, several robustness checks indicate that this result is not 
robust. Overall, we find that revenue decentralization is unrelated to economic out-
comes. In fact, there is even some evidence that sub-federal control over shared taxes 
leads to more economic growth.  
On the other hand, a high degree of political instead of fiscal autonomy of sub-federal 
units seems to impede economic growth, as indicated by the consistently negative sign 
of the federation dummy. These results show that it is important to distinguish between 
political and fiscal autonomy of lower-level governments when discussing whether de-
centralization improves or retards economic growth. While political autonomy seems to 
be harmful because of, for example, the introduction of additional veto players (Tsebe-
lis, 1995), fiscal decentralization seems to be either irrelevant or even favorable for eco-
nomic outcomes. 
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